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COLLOQUIUM
THE SUPREME COURT'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DOCKET: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES*
Introduction
THE HONORABLE MARSHALL

J. BREGER**

Chairman Breger: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name
is Marshall Breger. I am chairman of the Administrative Conference of
the United States (Administrative Conference or Conference).
As most of you know, the Administrative Conference is an independent agency charged with studying and promoting fairness and efficiency in federal administrative processes. Stated another way, the
Conference is the Federal Government's administrative law expert and
think tank.
Today's colloquy, "The Supreme Court's Administrative Law
Docket," will focus on Supreme Court cases decided last term that
dealt with administrative law questions. We hope that this will become
a yearly event at the Conference. However, our distinguished panel of
speakers has been invited to go beyond discussion of the past and to
speculate a little about the significance those decisions have for the future. You, of course, are invited to, by your questions, encourage them
to explore further.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has always been closely intertwined
with administrative law. In its early years, American administrative
law was taught together with constitutional law under the rubric of
* The Conference reproduced here as edited was held at the American Society of
Association Executives in Washington, D.C, on September 19, 1991. The participants
in
were asked to discuss the major cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
the preceding term.
** Solicitor, United States Department of Labor. B.A., M.A., 1967, J.D., 1973,
the
University of Pennsylvania; B. Phil., 1970, Oriel College, Oxford University. At
time of this Conference, Mr. Breger was the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
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"public law." ' It focused on such "big-picture" questions as the implication of separation of powers, the delegation of legislative
authority,
and the nature of judicial review.
With the coming of the New Deal, and later the Administrative
Procedure Act,2 the emphasis of administrative law shifted from
questions
of legitimacy and accountability to the procedures governing
agency
adjudication and rulemaking. Administrative law became,
if you will,
the study of the civil procedure of agency practice.
In recent years, administrative law has returned to questions
of democratic theory and the allocation of power among the branches
of government. I think this is a good thing. This renewed interest
encompasses such topics as the distribution of powers between
the branches,
judicial deference to agency interpretations, the famed
Chevron doctrine,3 presidential oversight of agency rulemaking, and the
meaning of
due process in informal administrative adjudications.
The Court's administrative law decisions last term reflect
this shift
back to "big-picture" questions. I believe the Court's administrative
law docket can be broken out into several categories. First,
there are
those decisions that deal with separation of powers and
delegation of
powers under the Constitution. One such case is Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft
Noise" wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the District
of Columbia
Circuit's conclusion that a Board of Review created by
Congress to
oversee the regional airport authority violated separation
of powers
principles. The Court reasoned that the Board could exercise
an executive function, yet consist of selected Members of Congress. 5
The Court
reached this conclusion even though the Board members
were appointed to serve in their personal, not in their official,
legislative
capacities.
Another decision in this category is Freytag v. Commissioner
of In1. "Public law" is the general field of law concerned with the structure
of government and the relationship between citizens and
their government. Thus, a standard
public law periodical in Great Britain might include
commentary on such subjects as
constitutional law, public administration, and administrative
law issues. "Private law,"
in contrast, concerns itself with the resolution of disputes between
private persons. See
generally PuB. LAW (Stevens & Son, Co., London, England, United
Kingdom, 19561991) (providing overview of public law in Great Britain).

2. Administrative

Procedure Act of 1946, Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1988)).
3.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837

(1984).
4. -

U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2298 (1991).
5. Id. at 2311-12.
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ternal Revenue 6 involving a challenge to the Tax Reform Act, which
authorized the chief judge of the Tax Court, a so-called Article I court,
to appoint commissioners, now called special trial judges. The Supreme
Court held that the chief judge's power to designate such special trial
judges to preside over any proceeding, regardless of complexity or
amount, does not run afoul of the Appointments Clause of Article II of
the Constitution.7 The Appointments Clause, as you may recall, requires the President to nominate and the Senate to approve, "officers of
the United States,"" but it allows Congress to vest the appointment of
"inferior officers in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments."9
The Court concluded that a special trial judge is an "inferior officer"
and must be appointed as prescribed in Article 11.10 A majority went
on to find the appointment valid because the Tax Court is a "court of
law" within the meaning of Article II.11
12
The final decision in this category is Touby v. United States. In
Touby, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to an amendment to
the Controlled Substances Act, which authorized the Attorney General
substances.1 3
to classify on a temporary, emergency basis controlled
The challengers claimed that the statute violated the non-delegation
doctrine,14 which generally provides that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of government.
However, the courts have consistently upheld delegations of power to
"an intelligible
the executive branch as long as Congress establishes
1 5 The Court concluded
delegate.
the
by
followed
be
principle" that can
that the delegation in question met that test.""
The second category of Supreme Court administrative law decisions
are those which address questions of deference to agency interpretations and actions, a category familiar to most as the Chevron doctrine
cases. In Rust v. Sullivan,17 the Supreme Court upheld, against a constitutional attack, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulations that limit the ability of federally funded family planning
6.
7.

- U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991).
U.S. CONST. art: II, § 2, cl. 2.

8. Id.

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2640.
Id. at 2645.
U.S. --, Ill S. Ct. 1752 (1991).
Id. at 1758.
Id. at 1756-58.
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
Touby, 111 S.Ct. at 1756-57.
Id. at 1759.
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clinics to counsel patients about the use of abortion as a method of
family planning. In doing so, the majority relied in part on Chevron
jurisprudence.18
A curious case raising the issue of judicial deference to agency interpretations is Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines.19 Pauley involved the black

lung benefits program originally created by Congress in 1969 to be administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW). The HEW Secretary was authorized to promulgate regulations regarding the determination and adjudication of claims.2 0 Congress later amended the law, assigning responsibility away from HEW
to the Department of Labor (DOL). However, Congress provided that
any new criteria established by the Labor Secretary "shall not be more

restrictive than the criteria

' 21

earlier adopted by HEW.

DOL's regulations were challenged as violating this provision, yet the
Supreme Court held that the DOL's rules were entitled to judicial deference,22 over the objection of Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia objected to
the fact that the deference was through the DOL, even though the
rules initially were set out by HEW.2
The third category of Supreme Court administrative law decisions
addresses standing, ripeness, and exhaustion of administrative remedies, the "gatekeeping" doctrines which determine whether or not parties can have their claims or grievances heard in federal court. Although these cases were not numerous in the last term, this is an area
that appears to be evolving, or at least moving, in the Court's
jurisprudence.
One standing case decided last term was Air Courier Conference of
America v. American Postal Workers Union, 4 in which the Court held

that the District of Columbia Circuit misapplied the zone of interests

test, as explained by the Court in Clarke v. Securities Industry
Association.25

Far more attention, however, was focused on a case to be decided
this coming term. It involves an appeal from the Eighth Circuit deci18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Rust, III S. Ct. at 1767.
U.S. _, 111 S.Ct. 2524 (1991).
30 U.S.C. § 921 (1988).
30 U.S.C. § 902(F)(2) (1988).
Pauley, I11 S. Ct. at 2534-35.
Id. at 2540 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. U.S. -.
111 S.Ct. 913 (1991).
I,
25. 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (describing "zone of interests" test as "a guide for
deciding whether, in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular
agency decision").
-
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sion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,"6 which held that the environmental group had standing to challenge a Department of Interior regulation interpreting the Endangered Species Act to not apply to actions
taken in foreign countries. The interest in this case stems from its simi7
larity to Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, in which the Court
denied the National Wildlife Federation standing to challenge the Bu8
reau of Land Management's land withdrawal review program.
This review of cases is not exhaustive. It is a brief introduction, however, to the Court's administrative law docket of last year.
Our distinguished speakers will take it from here and, most important, tell us what these cases really mean. Leading off, focusing on separation of powers cases, is Theodore B. Olson, a partner in the law firm
of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Mr. Olson is a litigator with extensive
experience in the fields of constitutional law, media litigation, commercial disputes, and appellate practice, including appearances before the
Supreme Court. Between 1981 and 1984, he was the Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). OLC, as you may
well know, formulates and articulates the Executive's position on constitutional issues. Mr. Olson is a member of the Administrative Conference, as well as a member of the Council of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
Mr. Olson will be followed by Professor Thomas 0. Sargentich, who
will comment on the state of the Chevron doctrine. Professor Sargentich teaches at the Washington College of Law, The American University, and has written extensively on administrative and constitutional
law issues. Tom also is an alumnus of the OLC, serving there from
1978 to 1983.
Our last speaker will be Professor William F. Funk, who will address
recent Court cases dealing with standing and ripeness and what the
future may hold in this area. Professor Funk currently teaches at the
Lewis and Clark Northwestern School of Law. Prior to joining the academic ranks, he served at the Department of Energy, on the staff of the
House Intelligence Committee, and also in the OLC at the Department
of Justice.
As you will note, you have to have worked at OLC to be a panelist.
Without that credit on your resume, you are reduced to being a
moderator.
Following the speakers' presentations, I will invite the speakers to
26.

911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1991).

27.

-

28.

U.S.

-,

Id. at 3187.

110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
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argue and debate amongst each other. After this exchange, I will invite
questions from the floor.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SUPREME COURT:
IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE TRENDS
THEODORE

B. OLSON, ESQ.*

Mr. Olson: As I look around this room, I see a powerful array of
expertise on the subjects that we are discussing today. I am sure that
my co-panelists feel as I do that we are engaging today in a colloquy
and not a presentation. So perhaps we should regard our role as simply
getting the discussion started by turning to the cases the Supreme
Court decided last year.
I will discuss the three cases on separation of powers that Marshall
mentioned. Just to confuse you, I will discuss them in the reverse order.
The Supreme Court did decide three cases last term that have implications for the separation of powers. The first, Touby v. United
States,2 involves the extent to which Congress can delegate legislative,
or what might be regarded as legislative, power to the executive
branch.
The Controlled Substances Act"0 authorizes the Attorney General to
specify products, the manufacture, possession, sale, or distribution of
which may subject an individual to criminal prosecution."1 The statute
articulates some fairly specific standards to which the Attorney General must adhere when designating a substance for inclusion on the
controlled substance list. He must start by having the affirmative recommendation by the Secretary of HHS'l and must then consider a
number of very specific factors.3 3 There is also a process of review and
*

Mr. Olson is a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Washington, D.C. B.A.,

cum laude, 1962, University of the Pacific; LL.B., 1965, Boalt Hall School
of Law,
University of California. He was formerly the Assistant Attorney General
with the
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.
29. U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1752 (1991).
30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-889 (1988).
31. Id. § 811(a).
32. Id. § 811(b) (stating that recommendations of Secretary shall be
binding on

Attorney General, and if Secretary recommends that drug or other substance
not be
controlled, Attorney General shall not control drug or other substance).
33. Id. § 811(c) (listing factors: (1) its actual or relative potential for
(2)
scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known; (3) state of currentabuse;
scientific
knowledge regarding

the drug or other substance; (4) its history and current pattern of
abuse; (5) scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) what, if any,
public health; (7) its psychic or physiological dependence liability; (8) risk there is to
whether substance is immediate precursor of substance already controlled under this
subchapter).

